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ABSTRACT: In 1969, Shoup postulated that the presence of interrelated
taxes in a tax system would reinforce the system of tax penalty ("self-
reinforcing penalty system of taxes"). In this paper, we have tried to
formally develop this idea. We find that in order that tax re-enforcement
holds, it is necessary that the interrelated taxes are administered by a single
tax administration, or in the case that they are administered by different tax
administrations, the level of collaboration between them has to be high
enough. If that is the case, tax evasion in interrelated taxes might be
considered as an alternative explanation of the existing gap between the
levels of tax evasion that can be guessed in practice and those much lower
predicted by the classical theory of tax evasion (Allingham and Sandmo,
1972; Yitzhaki, 1974). Otherwise, the result expected by Shoup might
even reverse. Moreover, as long as collaboration is imperfect, the classical
results of the comparative statics might change, since in some cases
although global tax compliance increases in front of a variation in a tax
parameter, it can decrease in a tax.
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1. Introduction
Kaldor (1956) argued that a tax system in which a capital gains tax, a personal income
tax, an expenditure tax, a wealth tax and an inheritance and donations tax were present,
just auditing one tax return, the extent of tax evasion could be checked
comprehensively. This is the so-called “self-checking system of taxes”. The reason of
his argument is based on the evident relationships among the tax bases of all those five
taxes. Thus, the sum of the amount of tax base declared in the expenditure tax and in the
capital gains tax should be congruent with the tax base declared in the personal income
tax. Otherwise, if it does not match, that might be due either because the taxpayer has
consumed part of her initial stock of wealth (or she has made a donation), or because
some of the tax bases have been under-declared. In the first case, that should be
compatible with a decrease in the tax base of the wealth tax (or with an increase in the
tax base of the recipient’s donations tax) once capital gains have also been taken into
account, while in the second case, that should be an useful hint to start a process of tax
auditing.
This certainly seems a powerful system to ease the tasks of the tax auditors. However,
note that congruity among tax bases does not necessarily imply that tax evasion is null.
That is why, Shoup (1969) suggested to rename the tax system proposed by Kaldor as a
“self-reinforcing penalty system of taxes”. That is, when the taxpayer faces the decision
about how much tax base to evade, she should bear in mind that as long as tax bases are
crosschecked, her decision might not only have consequences on that tax, but also on
other interrelated taxes. Hence, having increased the expected cost of tax evasion, a
priori such type of tax systems should be useful in promoting tax compliance. In our
paper, we will try to check that supposition by means of formally developing the
original ideas of Kaldor (1956) and Shoup (1969), and we will do it by focusing our
analysis on the interrelation between a wealth tax and a personal income tax. However,
this analysis cannot only be applied to individual taxes.
For example, Das-Gupta and Gang (2001) have recently developed a similar model of
tax evasion applied to the Value Added Tax (VAT) (see also the analysis of interrelated
tax evasion in the VAT by Fedeli and Forte, 1999). The reason to analyze the VAT
arises from the possibility of matching sales invoices against purchase invoices by part
of the tax administration. These authors find that although crosschecking might distort
purchase and sale decisions, a sufficiently high level of crosschecking can induce
truthful reporting. To a certain extent, Engel and Hines (1999) have also applied Shoup
(1969)’s idea in a dynamic setting (in fact, the seminal work by Allingham and Sandmo,
1972, section 5, also considered tax evasion within a dynamic setting). In their work,
these authors find that for a rational taxpayer, current evasion is a decreasing function of
prior evasion, since, if audited for evading taxes the current year, she may incur
penalties for past evasions as well. Within this framework, they estimate that tax
evasion is 42% lower than it would be if taxpayers were not concerned about
retrospective audits. These results are certainly very interesting, and make evident the
necessity to expand the classical analysis of tax evasion (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972;
Yitzhaki, 1974) taking into account the interrelation between tax bases, and so the
possibility of crosschecking by part of the tax administration.
In our paper, when incongruity is detected by the tax administration, the tax audit
probability tends to increase above its “normal” level. This provokes that as long as2
both taxes are administered by a single tax administration, congruity is the optimal
choice for the taxpayer. However, in some cases (typically, in federal systems) taxes are
not administered by the same layer of government. Then, as long as collaboration
between tax administrations is not perfect, it is possible that crosschecking is not
sufficient to induce congruity between tax returns. In particular, by imperfect
collaboration we refer to that situation under which when one tax administration is
carrying out an audit, it does not put too much effort in detecting tax evasion on behalf
of the other
1. Actually, imperfect collaboration implies that the level of tax compliance
might be even lower than the one predicted by the classical analysis! In any case, as
long as collaboration is perfect, or being imperfect it is not too low, tax evasion in
interrelated taxes might be considered as a partial explanation to the paradox of tax
evasion. The paradox of tax evasion comes out when the observed (or guessed) levels of
tax compliance and those predicted by the classical analysis are compared. In order to
achieve the observed levels of tax compliance from the classical analysis, the degree of
risk-aversion and/or the level of the tax enforcement parameters have to be abnormally
high. In order to overcome such paradox, the literature has proposed the existence both
of economic and non-economic factors (see, e.g., the clear and detailed review of this
literature by Alm, 1999). In general, the conclusion of the literature is that the original
model of gambling applied to tax evasion might be too simple as to take into account
the numerous factors that affect the reporting decisions of individuals. In this sense,
interrelated tax evasion might be considered as another factor to be taken into account,
and as we will show in the numerical simulations, in some occasions that factor can by
itself solve the paradox of tax evasion.
In the context of interrelated tax evasion, we have also performed a comparative static
analysis. Under the classical analysis, a reinforcement of any tax parameter tends to
promote tax compliance (see the review by Andreoni et al., 1998)
2. In our analysis, as
long as collaboration between tax administrations is perfect, those results remain
unchanged. Nonetheless, when collaboration is imperfect, the results might change. Due
to the ambiguity of the theoretical analysis in this latter situation, we have had to make
use of the methodology of numerical simulations. All the results of the exercise of
numerical simulation confirm those obtained by the classical analysis with respect to
global tax compliance, or at least when tax compliance in each tax is weighted by the
importance of their respective tax burdens. However, that result does no longer hold
                                                          
1 Niepelt (2002) analyzed tax evasion in a dynamic setting, and similarly to us considered the
possibility that during an audit tax evasion is not fully discovered. However, he justified this
assumption without referring to a lack of collaboration between tax administrations, but simply
as a handicap of a tax administration. In any case, according to his words, that provokes an
“uncorrelated detection risk”, which calls for analyzing tax evasion focusing on the many
sources of taxpayer’s tax base, instead of on the very taxpayer. This conclusion resembles very
much our differential analysis depending on whether congruity or incongruity is optimal form
the taxpayer’s point of view. In the former case, the unit of analysis will be the taxpayer, since
there do not arise differences in the level of tax compliance between tax bases, while in the
latter case, the unit of analysis is each tax base, since tax compliance is not homogenous across
taxes.
2 However, slightly modifying the original framework of the classical analysis, some authors
have recently shown that the signs of the comparative statics can reverse. For instance,
Boadway et al. (2002) or Brock (2002) have demonstrated that in certain circumstances an
increase in the penalty per unit of tax evaded can decrease tax compliance; while Lee (2001) has
shown the same, but for the case of an increase in the marginal tax rate.3
when tax compliance is analyzed tax by tax (see fn. 1). This result is extremely
important once we take into account that the policy decisions of one tax administration
(i.e., level of government) will have consequences not only on its tax base, but also on
the tax base of the other tax administration (level of government). Therefore, a tax
externality stemming from the tasks of tax administration arises as long as the
responsibilities on each tax hang on different layers of government. Cremer and Gahvari
(2000) considered the audit rate as an additional strategic tax parameter among sub-
national governments within a federal system; while Baccheta and Espinosa (1995)
analyzed the incentives to share information between national governments in an open
economy, although they did not included in their model the possibility of tax evasion.
Hence, the identification of a potential tax externality in the context of tax
administration is not totally new. Nevertheless, this confirms Andreoni et al. (1998)’s
statement in the sense that in order to avoid inefficient levels of tax compliance "... how
to integrate tax enforcement across different levels of government" (p. 835) may be one
of the issues among tax compliance that deserve further research. In any case, this line
of research is not dealt with in this paper.
In the following section, we formulate the theoretical model and our assumptions,
especially those referring to the tax audit probability in the presence of interrelated tax
evasion. The taxpayer’s decision over tax evasion is characterized, and a comparative
static analysis is performed. That analysis crucially depends on the degree of
collaboration between the tax administrations responsible for each tax. In section 3, we
carry out an exercise of numerical simulation, which permits us to complement the
results of the theoretical model. Thus, given a simple parameterization, we can ascertain
to what extent interrelated tax evasion can solve the paradox of tax evasion; under
which circumstances it is more likely that the tax bases declared in each tax return are
incongruent; and finally, to examine some of the ambiguities detected in the analytical
comparative statics. We conclude in section 4.
2. Theoretical Model
In this section, first, we will establish how the presence of interrelated taxes changes the
tax enforcement parameters, in particular, the tax audit probability. Obviously, this is
the key of all the theoretical analysis carried out in the paper. Next, we will analyze the
behavior of the taxpayer in this context of interrelated tax evasion, including a
comparative statics analysis. This analysis will be done both in the presence of perfect
and imperfect collaboration between tax administrations.
Assumptions about the tax audit probability
We suppose that the tax administration obtains valuable information from
crosschecking the tax returns of the taxpayers. In particular, for each taxpayer the tax
administration considers the following budget constraint:
S Y S C Y + = + = β                                             [1]
where Y is income obtained by a taxpayer during the fiscal year, which can be either
consumed, C, or saved, S (i.e., S is the increase in the stock of wealth obtained during4
that fiscal year
3), and β  is the marginal propensity to consume. Income is taxed in the
personal income tax, while savings are taxed in the wealth tax. Given the level of
income declared in the personal income tax,  D Y , the level of wealth declared in the
wealth tax,  D S , and supposing a certain marginal propensity to consume,  β
4, the tax
administration can infer whether the relationship given by expression [1] holds, that is,
D D D D S Y S ' C Y + = +
>
≤
β                                           [2]
where  ' C  is the level of taxpayer’s consumption inferred by the tax administration, and
Y YD ≤  and  S SD ≤ . As long as expression [2] holds with equality, the tax administration
will not appreciate any incongruity between the tax bases declared in each tax return,
and will not increase the tax audit probability above the "normal" level, that is, when
there is not any incongruity
5. Otherwise, an incongruity will be a "signal of alarm" for
the tax administration to audit the tax returns of the taxpayer
6. Graphically,
[FIGURE 1]
On the left hand side, the graph shows the tax audit probability in the personal income
                                                          
3 The budget constraint [1] could have been expressed within an inter-temporal framework,
although for simplification we have left aside such possibility. For instance, Y could have been
considered as the personal income obtained during a certain period of time, which has made
possible the accumulation of a certain stock of wealth, S, and a certain level of inter-temporal
consumption, C. Otherwise, given that the tax base of the wealth tax is the stock of wealth and
not the increase in wealth, for our analytical purposes, expression [1] has to be considered in
such a way that at the beginning of the fiscal year (i.e., at the beginning of the only period of our
static analysis), the stock of wealth of the taxpayer is null. As a consequence, in our theoretical
analysis there is not any difference between stock of wealth and increase in the stock of wealth.
4 From now on, we will suppose that the marginal propensity to consume adopted by the tax
administration (see expression [2] next) and the real one coincide. As we will see, this
assumption will make much easier the interpretation of the results of comparative statics.
5 Expression [2] could be modified in order to incorporate a margin of error,  0 > ε , i.e.,
ε β + +
>
≤
D D D S Y Y . For example, suppose that according to the personal income tax return YD=
100. Then, assuming  8 0, = β , the stock of wealth declared in the wealth tax should be 20, but in
fact, considering a certain margin of error of ± 10%, SD should be between 18 and 22. Otherwise,
if SD were above (below) 22 (18), the probability of auditing in the personal income tax (wealth
tax) would increase above its "normal" level. However, the results of our marginal analysis are
independent of the inclusion of a margin of error.
6 For instance, during summer 2002, in Spain the National Tax Administration (so-called
Agencia Estatal de la Administración Tributaria, AEAT), which is responsible for the auditing
of the personal income tax while the responsibility of auditing the wealth tax is shared with the
regional governments, extensively crosschecked the personal income tax and wealth tax returns.
The reason of that massive crosschecking was that, according to the Director of the AEAT, the
price of new houses and luxury cars purchased (in our words, an increase in the monetary value
of the stock of wealth) did not match income declared by the taxpayer in the personal income
tax. See, e.g., the information given by the newspaper La Vanguardia, 10/3/2002.5
tax, p
Y. As long as  C S Y D D + ≥ , the tax audit probability remains at its "normal" level,
Y p . Otherwise, the audit probability is increasing in the value of the incongruity,
0 > − + D D Y C S . Similarly, the graph on the right hand side shows the tax audit
probability in the wealth tax, p
S. In fact, summing both functions of probability of tax
auditing, we obtain the following function:
[FIGURE 2]
where we have assumed that 
S Y p p = . Therefore, keeping SD unchanged, for values of
YD below (above) SD+C an increase in YD decreases (increases) the probability of being




Hence, in our model the tax audit probability is endogenous, since it depends on the
level of tax bases declared, SD and YD. In the next section, we will try to identify those
situations under which the taxpayer might find it optimal to deviate from the strategy
that implies the minimisation of the probability of being audited, 
S Y p p + , that is, being
congruent ( D D Y C S = + ).
Definition: the tax audit probability, p, is a function 
Y S
D D p p ) Y , S ( p + = , such that for
D D Y C S > + ,  0 > ∂ ∂ D
Y S p  and  0 < ∂ ∂ D
Y Y p , while 
S p is a constant; for  D D Y C S < + ,
0 < ∂ ∂ D
S S p  and  0 > ∂ ∂ D
S Y p , being 
Y p  a constant; finally, for  D D Y C S = + , p is a
parameter, i.e., it is independent of the amount of tax bases declared.
... When collaboration between tax administrations is perfect.
In this section, we will analyse a situation under which either both tax returns (personal
income tax and wealth tax) are administered by only one tax administration or they are
administered by two different tax administrations (i.e., each one of them is a part of a
different layer of government) but collaboration between them is perfect. By perfect
collaboration we refer to that situation under which, for example, when the wealth tax
return is audited, not only tax evasion in the wealth tax is fully discovered but also in
the personal income tax. To the extent that there exists only one tax administration, it is
perfectly understandable that tax evasion in both taxes will be fully discovered
independently of which tax return is audited, since the total amount of tax revenue
collected will remain in hands of that single tax administration. However, when there
are two independent tax administrations, the situation is different: perfect collaboration
implies that the tax administration that is carrying out an audit (e.g., in the wealth tax)
will exert an additional effort in discovering tax fraud (e.g., in the personal income tax)
that will only benefit the other tax administration. In any case, by now, we will suppose
that even in the case that there were two (institutionally independent) tax
administrations, each one of them would have an incentive to fully discover evasion in
both taxes.
Characterization of the Taxpayer Behaviour
Following the classical analysis due to Allingham and Sandmo (1972), the taxpayer
attempts to minimise the amount of taxes paid. However, such decision is not without
risk, since her tax fraud might be detected by the tax administration depending on the6
tax auditing probability. Then, if she is audited, she will be fined proportionally to the
amount of taxes evaded. We assume that the taxpayer is risk-averse,
' )' Y ( U )' Y ( U > > 0 , where U(Y) is the utility that the taxpayer derives from income
7, Y,
which is an exogenous variable in our model
8. Analytically, the objective function of
the taxpayer, W, is the following:
[]
[] D P D R
S Y
D P D R D P D R
S Y
S t Y t Y U ) p p (                      
) S S ( Ft ) Y Y ( Ft S t Y t Y U ) p p ( W
− − − − +
+ − − − − − − + ≡
1
 
The first summand in square brackets (from now on, denoted by A) is income at
disposal of the taxpayer net of paying taxes when she is audited. In that case, the
taxpayer pays taxes in the personal income tax according to the (marginal) tax rate tR
( 1 0 ≤ ≤ R t ), but as long as she has evaded taxes ( D Y Y > ), she will also have to pay F
per each unit of tax evaded in the personal income tax, tR(Y-YD), where  1 ≥ F . The same
reasoning applies to the case of the wealth tax, where the marginal tax rate in that case
is  P t  ( 1 0 ≤ ≤ P t ). The second summand in square brackets (from now on, denoted by B)
is income at disposal of the taxpayer when none of the tax returns is audited. Given the
presence of perfect collaboration between tax administrations, only those two states can
occur: A or B. The probability of occurrence of the first one is 
Y S p p + , i.e., it occurs
when any of the two tax administrations audits
9, while state B occurs when none of
them audits, being 
Y S p p − − 1 the probability of occurrence of that state.
As we have said before, the objective of the taxpayer is minimising the amount of taxes
paid, that is, given the existence of taxes, the taxpayer aims at maximising net income
10.
Therefore, she will choose YD and SD  such that expression [3] is maximised.
Nevertheless, we know that as long as she is incongruent with respect to the amount of
tax bases declared ( D D S ' C Y
>
≤
+ ), the tax audit probabilities of expression [3] are
endogenous. Thus, before solving the maximisation problem of the taxpayer, we need to
know whether (in)congruity can be an optimal strategy for her.
Is optimal to be congruent in the tax bases declared?
We are assuming that independently of which tax return is originally audited, both tax
                                                          
7 Partial derivatives of functions of only one variable will be denoted by a prime, while for
functions of more than one variable, a subscript will indicate the variable of the corresponding
partial derivative.
8 See Pencavel (1979), for a model of tax evasion in which Y (labor supply) is considered as an
endogenous variable; and other references cited in Andreoni et al. (1998), p. 824.
9 Although it does not modify the results of the present analysis, the possibility that both tax
administrations simultaneously carry out a tax audit can be reasonably ruled out, i.e., p
Y× p
S=0.
Therefore, those two events can be considered as mutually exclusive.
10 This characterization of a rational taxpayer is consistent with the following description given
by Cowell (1990): "(he) is "predisposed to dishonesty" because the taxpayer does not put
responsibility to the State before his own interests" (p. 50).
  [3]7
evasion in the personal income tax and in the wealth tax are fully discovered by the tax









S D D D D p p p p = = = , and 
S Y p p = . Therefore, from now on, unless necessary,
we will not distinguish between 
Y p and 
S p , and will simply refer to p, which is 
Y p +
S p . Under such assumptions, we wonder whether under certain circumstances it will be
optimal for the taxpayer to be incongruous.
For instance, we wonder whether it could be optimal that  D D Y ' C S > + . In that case, and
keeping  D Y constant, the following conditions should hold:
[] [ ] 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1








Y ' C S D
D
D D
       [4]
where the index 1 is necessary since obviously the (marginal) utility of income is not
the same for all levels of SD and YD, but also the tax audit probability might vary
according to those two variables. Hence, in expression [4], the index 1 is referring to a
situation under which  D D Y ' C S < + . The next condition – which implies that SD+C’=YD
is not an optimal strategy for the taxpayer - should also hold
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where 0
1 <
D S p ,  2 1 p p > ,  ) B ( U ) A ( U i i <  and  )' B ( U )' A ( U i i >   ∀   i; while at the
(supposed) optimum,
[] [ ] 0 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 3
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where  0
3 >
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The next Lemma states the non-optimality of incongruity from a rational taxpayer’s
point of view.
Lemma: As long as  0 >
D S p  and  0 >
D Y p , it will always be optimal for the taxpayer to
be congruous. Otherwise, the optimal strategy for the taxpayer is indeterminate.8
Proof: the reasoning is as follows. Expression [6] must hold both for  D S and  D Y , that is,
at the optimum,
[] [ ] 0 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 3








Y ' C S D
D
D D
          [8]
Then, given that  0
3 <
D Y p  and  ) B ( U ) A ( U 3 3 < , in order expression [8] holds, it is
necessary that  0 1 1 3 3 3 3 < − − − )' B ( U ) p ( )' A ( U ) F ( p . However, according to expression
[6], and given that  0
3 >
D S p ,  0 1 1 3 3 3 3 > − − − )' B ( U ) p ( )' A ( U ) F ( p . Therefore, expressions
[6] and [8] cannot hold simultaneously, and incongruity cannot be an optimum. Given
that the same reasoning is applicable for the case in which  D D Y ' C S < + , congruity is the
only possible solution as long as  0 >
D S p  and  0 >
D Y p . In the case that the probability
of auditing is independent of incongruity, i.e.  0 =
D S p  and  0 =
D Y p , the solution to the
maximisation of expression [3] is indeterminate, being congruity one of the many
solutions 
We have shown that incongruity can never be an optimal strategy for a rational taxpayer
in the case that the tax audit probability is conditioned on the incongruity between tax
returns and collaboration between tax administrations is perfect. The reason is that, for
example, in order  D D Y ' C S > + to be optimal, the taxpayer’s welfare reduction due to a
higher probability of tax auditing with respect to its "normal" level, 
Y Y p p > , must be
overcome by the net expected gains of increasing tax compliance in the wealth tax
keeping the tax audit probability constant. Nevertheless, given that the sign of these
latter expected gains is independent of the (marginal) tax rate, there would still be gains
of increasing  D Y . Moreover, in that case, increasing  D Y  would also produce a decrease
in the tax auditing probability (through a reduction in p
Y). Thus, the strategy under
which  D D Y ' C S > +  can never be optimal, since in that situation it would always be
welfare enhancing to increase  D Y
11. From the point of view of the taxpayer, that means
that both tax bases are perfect substitutes, and so she simply aims at minimizing the tax
auditing probability, p.
Optimal level of tax base declared
We have previously described the taxpayer as a rational individual predisposed to
dishonesty (see also fn. 10). That is, an individual who aims at maximising her own
                                                          
11 To a certain extent, the result provided by the Lemma is similar to the one obtained under a
“cut-off” rule (see Border and Sobel, 1987; Reinganum and Wilde, 1985; Sánchez and Sobel,
1993). Under such a rule, the tax administration establishes a threshold below which all
taxpayers are audited, while above it all taxpayers are unaudited. Then, assuming that taxpayers
are risk-neutral and that the tax administration can commit to such audit rule, all those taxpayers
with a tax base above the threshold declare just the amount fixed by the threshold. In our case,
the threshold is endogenous. For instance, from the point of view of the tax administration
responsible for the personal income tax, the relevant threshold is SD+C’, being SD endogenous
from the point of view of the taxpayer. Then, in our model, despite the assumption of risk-
aversion, the taxpayer finds it optimal to declare just the amount fixed by the threshold, or in
our words, finds it optimal to be congruent.9
welfare by means of deciding how much tax base to declare independently of the
consequences of her decision over the rest of the society
12. The social consequences of
her actions basically refer to the loss of tax revenues for the government (and so public
good provision) due to the erosion of the tax base. Analytically, the taxpayer solves the
following maximisation problem:
' C S Y s.t. Y , S
W Max
D D D D + =            
          
Therefore, once  D Y has been substituted into W (which has been previously defined by
means of expression [3]), the only decision variable of the taxpayer is  D S . This is the
decision we will deal with. Then, the FOC of the maximisation problem with respect to
D S  is the following:
)' B ( U ) p ( ) F ( )' A ( pU − = − 1 1                                                                                     [9]
That is, at the optimum, the marginal cost of evading taxes (left hand side of expression
[9]) equals the marginal benefit of evading taxes (right hand side of expression [9]).
Finally, in order to guarantee that full tax compliance (S=SD) is not an optimal strategy
for the taxpayer, and making use of expression [7], we obtain the classical condition
that 1 < pF  (vid. Yitzhaki, 1974, expression [6']
*)
13. From now on, we will assume that
such condition holds, and so at the optimum  D S S > .
Comparative statics
As we have shown above, in the case of perfect collaboration between tax
administrations, congruity is the only optimal strategy. Then, in order to perform an
exercise of comparative statics, we will just analyse the way in which reported wealth,
SD, depends on the parameters of the model  p , t , t , F R P , since congruity implies that YD
can be directly obtained from  ) /( S Y D D β − = 1 .
In order to obtain  dF dSD , first, we totally differentiate expression [9], Φ ,
[ ]
[]            dS ) B ( R )' B ( U ) p ( ) F )( A ( R )' A ( pU ) t ' t ( -                
dF ) F ))( S S ( t ) Y Y ( t )( A ( R )' A ( pU )' A ( pU ) t ' t ( d
D P R
D P D R P R
− + − +






where we have used the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion,
() 0 ≥ − = ) A ( ' U ) A ( ' ' U ) A ( R , and identically for state B. In expression [10], tR’=tR/(1-
                                                          
12 See, e.g., Bordignon (1993) for a model that takes into account moral issues when describing
the taxpayer's behavior; or Cowell and Gordon (1988), and Alm et al. (1992), who consider the
taxpayer's evaluation of the activity of the public sector; see also the references cited by
Andreoni et al. (1998), section 8; and the complete review by Alm (1999), already cited in the
introduction.
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P R D D β
                            [11]
Thus, an increase in the penalty per unit of tax evaded reduces the level of tax evasion
in the wealth tax, and given congruity, also in the personal income tax
15. The numerator
of expression [11] can be disintegrated into an income effect and a substitution effect.
On the one hand, this latter effect, pU(A)', picks up the increase in the profitability of
tax compliance due to the increase in the fine per unit of tax evaded; on the other hand,
an income effect, pU(A)'R(A)(F-1)(Y-YD)(1-β )(tR’+tP), is also positive, since the
increase in F reduces net income of the taxpayer both in state A and B, and given the
assumption of decreasing risk-aversion, this tends to increase the valuation of the
marginal cost of tax evasion more than the valuation of the marginal benefit, and so to
increase tax compliance.
In the case of an increase in  P t , operating as above but also making use of the FOC
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D                                                         [12]
since according to the usual assumption about decreasing absolute risk aversion,
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D                                                          [13]
In front of an increase in any of the marginal tax rates, only an income effect is present,
since a rise in the marginal tax rate simultaneously increases the penalty per unit of tax
evaded, and so the substitution effect vanishes (see Yitzhaki, 1974). Note that as long as
the wealth tax is assigned to one government and the personal income tax to another,
considering tax evasion in interrelated taxes permits the detection of a tax externality
between governments. For instance, according to expression [13], an increase in the
marginal tax rate of the personal income tax will not only affect the amount of tax base
declared in that tax (and so the amount of tax revenue collected), but also in the wealth
tax. Finally, comparing [12] and [13], it is easily verifiable that  P D R D dt dS dt dS > as
long as β >0.
                                                          
14 This alternative definition of tR comes out from expression [2] when it holds with equality,
YD(1-β )=SD. Then, an increase in SD (and consequently in YD by 1/(1-β )) makes that the
marginal tax rate of the personal income tax borne by the taxpayer is tR/(1-β ), and not just tR,
such that tR’>tR.
15 Note that, on the one hand, dYD/dF=(1/(1-β ))(dSD/dF), and so the total effect of increasing F
on the amount of tax bases declared is dSD/dF(1+(1/(1-β ))). On the other hand, in terms of
elasticity, ε , there is not any difference between the variation in SD and the variation in YD, i.e.,
F , Y F , S D D ε ε = .11
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where only a substitution effect is at work.
From the results of this section, we can conclude that when collaboration between tax
administrations is perfect, the results of the comparative statics do not differ from the
original results due to Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and Yitzhaki (1974). However, as
we suggested above, it is important to note that as long as we consider tax evasion in
interrelated taxes, the statutory tax parameters of any of both taxes (tR or tP) or those
instruments set by a tax administration (F,  p
Y  or  p
S)
16 simultaneously affect the
behaviour of the taxpayer in both taxes. That is, we have been able to identify a tax
externality. Therefore, from a social point of view, it seems necessary that those
parameters are decided taking into account their effects on both taxes, otherwise their
level will not be optimal with respect to that situation under which the tax
administration is fully integrated and the power to change the statutory tax parameters is
at hands of just one government. In Shoup (1969)’s terminology, the interrelation
between tax bases creates a “self-reinforcing penalty system of taxes”
17. In the
numerical simulations of Section 3, we will analyse these issues in more detail in the
sense of checking how this system of taxes raises the level of tax compliance.
... When collaboration between tax administrations is imperfect.
In the case collaboration between tax administrations is imperfect, when the taxpayer is
caught evading taxes only a share of the tax revenue due to the other tax administration
is discovered. That might be understood as a low powered incentive of the tax
administration that has audited to collect tax revenue on behalf of the other tax
administration
18.
Then, in the case of imperfect collaboration, net income at disposal of the taxpayer
when the tax administration responsible for the personal income tax audits is
                                                          
16 Certainly, the value of F is legally set by the political power. However, a tax inspector might
discretionally vary its value depending on the development of the tax auditing process. In this
sense, see OECD (1990) for a comparison among OECD's countries about the divergence
between the legal value of F and the real one set by tax auditors.
17 Note that, as suggested in the introduction, this is quite different from a “self-checking system
of taxes” (Kaldor, 1956), since from the level of income (wealth) declared, it is not possible to
be fully certain that the inferred level of wealth (income) is such that tax evasion is null.
18 Obviously, if there exists only one tax administration, there might also exist internal
inefficiencies within that tax administration. For instance, it could be the case that different
departments within the same tax administration - each one of them in charge of a tax or of a
group of taxes - might not fully cooperate between them. Then, it would not be necessary to
consider the possibility that there were two imperfectly coordinated tax administrations in order
that in some occasions the percentage of tax evasion discovered is less than 100%. In any case,
although it is not relevant for our analysis, the non-cooperative possibility seems less likely
within a tax administration than between two institutionally independent tax administrations.12
) S S ( Ft ) Y Y ( Ft t S t Y Y A D Y P D R P D R D − − − − − − ≡ α                                                     [15]
where  Y α  is the percentage of tax evasion discovered in the wealth tax, such that
1 0 < ≤ Y α . In the case of perfect collaboration between tax administrations,  1 = Y α
19.
Similarly, when the tax administration responsible for the wealth tax audits, net income
is
) S S ( Ft ) Y Y ( Ft t S t Y Y D D P D S R P D R D − − − − − − ≡ α                                   [16]
where again  1 0 < ≤ S α . Finally, when none of both tax administrations carries out a tax
audit, net income is
P D R D t S t Y Y E − − ≡                                                         [17]
Hence, for instance, from [16], as long as  1 < S α , it is not clear whether an increase in
the amount of tax base declared in the personal income tax,  D Y , increases the amount of




− + − = ) F ( t ) F ( ' t D P S R SD α                                                     [18]
where recall that tR’=tR/(1-β ) (vid. footnote 14). Only as long as
[] 1 > + + > ) t ' t ( ) t ' t ( F P S R P R α , expression [18] will be positive as in the case in which
collaboration is perfect and the tax administration responsible for the wealth tax is
auditing. Thus, contrary to that situation, in order marginal net income increases as a
consequence of having reduced the level of tax evasion, it is no longer sufficient that
1 > F if  1 < S α . Otherwise, as long as  [] ) t ' t ( ) t ' t ( F P S R P R + + < α , although one of the
two tax administrations were auditing, the taxpayer would still obtain marginal
increases in net income evading taxes
20. As we will check, in part that possibility will
make ambiguous the results of the comparative statics when collaboration between tax
administrations is imperfect. However, before performing the exercise of comparative
statics, again we previously need to know whether incongruity or just congruity as
before is an optimal strategy for the taxpayer.
Is optimal to be congruent in the tax bases declared?
In the case of imperfect collaboration between tax administrations incongruity might be
an optimal strategy for the taxpayer. In order to show such result, let analyse the
possibility under which  D D Y ' C S < + . Then, the following FOC’s should hold:
                                                          
19 Given that the percentage of tax fraud discovered depends on the effort carried out by the tax
administration (that is, the level of collaboration between tax administrations), Y α could also be
interpreted as the effort of the tax administration in discovering tax evasion on behalf of the
other tax administration. Thus, for example, for 1 = Y α , that level of effort is maximum.
20 An alternative explanation for the negative sign of expression [18] is that the level of tR’ (with
respect to tP) is relatively high, while the level of α S is low enough and in any case it is not
compensated by a big value of F.13
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such that  ) E ( U ) A ( U i i < , and  )' E ( U )' A ( U i i > i ∀ , and  0
1 <
D Y p ; but also
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while at the (supposed) optimum, the following two conditions should hold:
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such that  ) D ( U ) E ( U i i > , and  )' E ( U )' D ( U i i > i ∀ , and  0
3 >
D Y p ; and
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D S p . According to expression [21], at equilibrium, the welfare cost of
marginally increasing YD  caused by a higher level of p,  [] 0 3 3
3 < − ) E ( U ) D ( U p
D Y , is
exactly compensated by the welfare benefit of increasing tax compliance keeping the
tax audit probability constant. Instead, according to expression [22], the welfare benefit
that produces an increase in SD due to a lower level of p is compensated by the welfare
cost when the tax audit probability remains constant. In any case, note that as long as
collaboration between tax administrations is imperfect (see again fn. 18), nothing
impedes incongruity to be an optimal strategy for the taxpayer.
In order to ascertain under what circumstances it is more likely that from the taxpayer's
point of view  D D Y ' C S < +  is an optimal strategy, using expressions [21] and [22] we can
obtain the following necessary condition:
) F ( )' D ( U p ) F ( )' A ( U p )' E ( U ) p p ( ) F ( )' D ( U p ) F ( )' A ( U p S
S Y S Y S
Y
Y 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 − + − < − − < − + − α α
   [23]
so,
) ( )' A ( U p ) ( )' D ( U p Y
Y
S
S α α − < − 1 1 3 3 3 3                                                                       [24]
Note that if the tax audit probability functions are symmetric, for  D D Y ' C S < + , 
Y S p p 3 3 > .
In general, expression [24] implies that all the tax parameters referred to the personal
income tax have to be more stringent than those referring to the wealth tax, that is,
Y S α α >  and  P R t t >  (and, leaving aside the assumption of symmetry, also p
Y>p
S). For14
instance, if we suppose that  1 < S Y ,α α , but  S Y α α = , it can be shown that expression
[24] necessarily implies  P R t ' t > , since only then  )' D ( U )' A ( U 3 3 > . Thus, given 
Y S p p 3 3 >
and supposing  S Y α α = , a necessary condition for being optimal that a taxpayer evades
less taxes in the personal income tax than in the wealth tax is simply that the tax rate of
the former tax is lower than the tax rate of the wealth tax weighted by the marginal
propensity to save. That is, the reduction in disposable income has to be relatively
greater when the tax administration responsible for the personal income tax audits than
when the other tax administration carries out an audit
21. On the whole, contrary to the
case of perfect collaboration, SD and YD are no longer perfect substitutes with respect to
the optimal decision over tax evasion.
a) … when it is optimal to be congruent
Optimal level of tax base declared
In the case of congruity and imperfect collaboration, the FOC is obtained from the
following maximisation problem:
' C S Y s.t.  Y , S
' W Max
D D D D + =           
          
where  E ) p p ( D p A p ' W
S Y S Y − − + + = 1 , and A, D and E have been previously defined by
expressions [15], [16] and [17], respectively. Now, in contrast to the case of perfect
collaboration, net income is not the same after having audited each tax administration,
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As long as marginal income is positive under states A and D, the left-hand side of the
equation (first row) can be defined as the marginal cost of evading taxes (or marginal
benefit of tax compliance), while the right-hand side (second row) is the marginal
benefit of evading taxes (or marginal cost of tax compliance). Nevertheless, as we




D D S S D , A ). Thus, as long as one of the summands of the first row had a negative sign,
it should be considered as a marginal benefit of tax evasion and not as a marginal cost
                                                          
21 In fact, in our static model where the initial stock of wealth is null (see fn. 3), this seems the
most plausible assumption, since the marginal tax rates of the wealth tax tend to be much lower
than those of the personal income tax, and additionally the tax base of the former tax is just a
percentage (1-β ) of the tax base of the latter tax. However, as long as we were dealing with a
dynamic model which had made possible the accumulation of a stock of wealth, although the
tax rate of the wealth tax were lower than the tax rate of the personal income tax, the tax base of
the wealth tax (now, a real stock of wealth) could be big enough in terms of current personal
income as to make more burdensome the wealth tax than the personal income tax, and so
SD+C’>YD could equally be a plausible optimal strategy for the taxpayer.15
of tax evasion
22.
From now on, we will assume that SD<S, which requires that expression [7] holds, in
this case applied to the case of imperfect collaboration between tax administrations,




R t ' t ) p p ( F t ) p p ( F ' t + < + + + α α                                                                  [26]
Therefore, expression [26] has the same interpretation than the classical condition that
guarantees an inner solution, that is, the summation of expected penalties when the
taxpayer decreases tax compliance and is caught evading taxes (left-hand side of the
inequality) is smaller than the certain amount of taxes due when the taxpayer increases
tax compliance (right-hand side of the inequality)
23.
Comparative statics
First, we will analyze how the tax base declared, SD, varies in front of an increase in F.
Nevertheless, given that in this case the exercise of comparative statics is much more
cumbersome than when collaboration between tax administrations is perfect, and given







=                                  [27]
where  Φ  is the FOC of the taxpayer's maximization problem (expression [25]). Thus,
since the SOC of the maximisation problem really holds
24,  0 < Φ
D S ,
{} {} F sign dF dS sign D ∂ Φ ∂ = , we will simply have to calculate the partial derivative
F ∂ Φ ∂ , and equally for the rest of parameters of the model. Hence,
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                                                     [28]
                                                          
22 Obviously, it cannot be the case that those two summands are negative at the same time, since
then there would not be a solution to the maximization problem.
23 In any case, as expected, the condition given by expression [26] is less stringent than the
classical one, pF<1. This can be easily shown once expression [26] is re-written as follows:
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Both a substitution and an income effect provoke that the optimal reaction of the
taxpayer is unambiguously positive. The first two rows show the latter effect, which is
always positive, and so points out in the direction of increasing  D S . This is so since, on
the one hand, in the case in which  0 1 1 < − + − ) F ( t ) F ( ' t P S R α ,  ) D ( R ) A ( R > and
S R P Y P R ' t t t ' t α α + > + , while the reverse occurs when
) F ( t ) F ( ' t ) F ( t ) F ( ' t P S R Y P R 1 1 0 1 1 − + − < < − + − α α , which ensures the positive sign of
the first row. On the other hand, when  0 1 1 > − + − ) F ( t ) F ( ' t P S R α and
0 1 1 > − + − ) F ( t ) F ( ' t Y P R α , the income effect is also positive, which can be easily
checked if  F ∂ Φ ∂  is analyzed without making use of the FOC. A substitution effect in
favour of increasing  D S  is shown in the last two rows of expression [28]
25.
In the case of an increase in  R t ,
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In the first two rows, there appears an income effect, while in the third row there
appears a substitution effect. On the one hand, as long as  1 = Y α , a substitution effect
always points out in the direction of decreasing  D S , while when  1 < Y α , the sign of that
effect is ambiguous. The reason is as follows: if  1 = Y α ,  S Y α α >  (given the hypothesis
of imperfect collaboration), and then in front of an increase in  R t the relative benefit of
evading taxes when collaboration is imperfect increases, since in that case tax evasion in
the personal income tax is not fully discovered is state D, while it is in the wealth tax.
Instead, if  1 < Y α , it is not possible to ascertain the sign of the substitution effect, since
S Y α α
>
≤
, and the final net effect will also depend on the marginal utility of income in
each one of the three possible states (A, D and E)
26. On the whole, we can conclude that
                                                          
25 In the third row of expression [28], note that the fraction that appears in brackets is simply
p
YU(A)', which confirms the positive sign of a substitution effect independently of the sign of
marginal income in state A and state D.
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1 , i.e., supposing a risk-neutral taxpayer, it
is calculated as the marginal income that would be obtained increasing tax evasion with respect
to that situation under which tax evasion is null. Then,  ) (











where in order to simplify we have supposed that 
S Y p p p = = . Then, it is clear that as long as
Y S α α < , in front of an increase in  R t , the profitability of increasing tax evasion (i.e., reducing
SD) has increased,  0 >
R t r , while the reverse happens when  Y S α α > . As in the classical
analysis, if α S=α Y, the substitution effect vanishes independently of whether the degree of
collaboration between tax administrations is perfect or not. Thus, in front of an increase in the17
the lower (higher) the level of collaboration of the tax administration responsible for the
wealth tax with respect to the level collaboration of the other tax administration, the
more likely that the increase in tR tends to promote tax evasion (compliance). Therefore,
the analysis of tax evasion in interrelated taxes has permitted to identify a situation
(imperfect collaboration between tax administrations) under which the theoretical
classical results on tax evasion might fail, that is, an increase in the (marginal) tax rate
might not produce an increase in tax compliance.
On the other hand, the net impact of the income effect is more difficult to ascertain due
to the ambiguity of the sign of the first row of expression [29] when
0 1 1 < − + − ) F ( t ) F ( ' t Y P R α , while the sign of the second row is clearly positive, that is,
in favor of increasing SD. The reason of that ambiguity is the following: an increase in tR
will certainly diminish net income both in state A and in state D, and so the valuation of
marginal income will have increased. However, as long as  0 1 1 < − + − ) F ( t ) F ( ' t Y P R α ,
marginal increases in SD under state A have to be considered as a marginal cost of tax
compliance. Then, contrary to the traditional case, given that the marginal impact of the
increase in tR is greater under state A than under state D, i.e., 
R R t t D A > , the valuation
of the marginal cost of tax compliance has increased more than the valuation of the
marginal benefit of tax compliance (i.e., net income in state D). Under these
circumstances, for  0 1 1 < − + − ) F ( t ) F ( ' t Y P R α , a sufficient condition to avoid such
ambiguity is that the valuation of the marginal benefit of tax compliance is big enough
with respect to the valuation of the marginal cost of tax compliance such that
) A ( R ) D ( R S > α .
On the whole, the sign of expression [29] is not clear-cut, since a substitution and an
income effect might have contradictory signs. Hence, we are back to the ambiguity
originally detected by Allingham and Sandmo (1972). For instance, note that if  1 = Y α ,
a substitution effect incentives a decrease in SD, while an income effect points out right
in the contrary direction, since for  1 = Y α , there is not ambiguity with respect to the
income effect.
In the case of an increase in  P t ,
[] [ ] [ ] {}
[] {}
[] {} 0 1 2 1 1
1 1
         




− − + − + − − −
− + −
−
− − + − + − +
+ − − + − − + − − = Φ
) ( F ) ( )' D ( U p ) ( )' E ( U ) p p (
) (Fá t ) (F ' t
' Ft
) S S ( F ) A ( R S ) E ( R ) A ( R ) t ' t ( )' E ( U ) p p
)) S S ( F ( ) D ( R ) A ( R S ) D ( R ) A ( R ) F ( t ) F ( ' t )' D ( U p






D Y D P R
S Y
D Y D P S R
S
t P




As long as  1 = Y α , a substitution effect always points out in the direction of increasing
D S , while when  1 < Y α , the sign of the substitution effect is ambiguous. The reasoning
is identical to the one given above with respect to 
R t Φ , although the signs are obviously
                                                                                                                                                                         
marginal tax rate, imperfect collaboration only modifies the profitability of tax evasion as long
as both tax administrations do not exert the same level of effort in auditing on behalf of the
other tax administration.18
reversed
27. In the first two rows, there appears an income effect, which sign is again
ambiguous. In this case, the ambiguity comes from those situations under which
0 1 1 < − + − ) F ( ' t ) F ( t S R P α , being  ) D ( R ) A ( R Y > α  a sufficient condition to avoid it.
In the case of an increase in 
Y p ,
{} 0 1 1
>
≤
+ + − + − = Φ ) t t ( )' E ( U ) F ( t ) F ( ' t )' A ( U P R Y P R p
Y α                                      [31]
Only a substitution effect is at work. As long as  0 1 1 > − + − ) F ( t ) F ( ' t Y P R α , an increase
in 
Y p always provokes an increase in  D S . Otherwise, the sign is ambiguous.
Paradoxically, an increase in 
Y p might be welcome by the taxpayer as long as the tax
administration on behalf of the personal income tax does not collaborate very much
with the other tax administration, and then given the value of the rest of relevant
parameters,  0 1 1 < − + − ) F ( t ) F ( ' t Y P R α . In that case, the expected profitability of
evading taxes will have increased, since the rise in p
Y has made more likely a state
under which, even though one tax administration is auditing, the taxpayer can still
obtain increases in net income evading taxes. This is certainly a curious result that
directly stems from the absence of perfect collaboration between tax administrations.
Similarly in the case of an increase in 
S p ,
{} 0 1 1
>
≤
+ + − + − = Φ ) t t ( )' E ( U ) F ( t ) F ( ' t )' D ( U P R P S R p
S α                                      [32]
Again, as long as  0 1 1 > − + − ) F ( t ) F ( ' t P S R α α , the sign is unambiguously positive.
Otherwise, being only a substitution effect at work, the reason of the ambiguity is the
same than the one given above with respect to expression [31].
Finally, we are interested in showing how a reinforcement of the collaboration between
tax administrations varies the level of SD. First, when the tax administration responsible
for the personal income tax increases its auditing effort with respect to the wealth tax:
[] {} 0 1 1 1
>
≤
− + − − + = Φ ) F ( t ) F ( ' t ) S S )( A ( R Ft )' A ( U p Y P R D P
Y
Y α α                     [33]
As long as  0 1 1 > − + − ) F ( t ) F ( ' t Y P R α ,  0 > Φ
Y α , otherwise, the sign is ambiguous. A
substitution effect always points out in the direction of increasing tax compliance,
0 > P
Y Ft )' A ( U p , while the sign of an income effect can go either way, depending on
the sign of marginal income in state A. In the case that  0 1 1 < − + − ) F ( t ) F ( ' t Y P R α , a
reinforcement of the collaboration by part of the tax administration responsible for the
personal income tax certainly reduces net income in state A, which increases the
valuation of a marginal cost of tax compliance. As a consequence of the increase in that
                                                          











tP α α .19
marginal valuation, there is an incentive to decrease the level of tax compliance.
Second, we analyse the variation in SD when the tax administration responsible for the
wealth tax increases its auditing effort with respect to the personal income tax:
[] {} 0 1 1 1
>
≤
− + − − + = Φ ) F ( t ) F ( ' t ) S S )( D ( R ' Ft )' D ( U p P S R D R
S
S α α                   [34]
If  0 1 1 > − + − ) F ( t ) F ( ' t P S R α ,  0 > Φ
S α , otherwise, the sign is ambiguous. The
reasoning of this ambiguity is identical to the one given above with respect to
expression [33].
Undoubtedly, the results of the comparative statics concerning collaboration between
tax administrations are quite interesting. An increase in collaboration between tax
administrations is always a good thing in the sense of promoting higher levels of tax
compliance only as long as marginal net income is positive in all those states where one
tax administration is auditing (so, note that it is not strictly necessary that α i=1).
Otherwise, paradoxically, an increase in collaboration between tax administrations
might produce a lower level of tax compliance! In Figure 3, on the left-hand side, there
appears the level of α S from which an increase in α S creates a substitution and an
income effect that unambiguously promote tax compliance. Similarly, on the right-hand
side, there appears the threshold with respect to the level of collaboration of the tax
administration responsible for the personal income tax, α Y.
[FIGURE 3]
b) … when it is optimal to be incongruent
When collaboration between tax administrations is not perfect and incongruity between
tax returns conditions the tax audit probability, the taxpayer might find it optimal not to
be congruent. In this section, we will simply try to sketch how this strategy affects the
results of the comparative statics, while the methodology of numerical simulation will
complement this initial analysis.
Optimal level of tax base declared
We will analyze the case in which YD>SD+C. The objective function of the taxpayer
does not vary with respect to the previous case. Thus, there are still three possible states:
A,  D and E  (expressions [15], [16] and [17], respectively), but now the tax audit
probability for each one of those three states is endogenous. Moreover, there are two
decision variables: SD and YD. Taking all this into account, the FOC’s of the
maximization problem are the following:
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where 0 >
D Y p . In fact, given that YD>SD+C, an increase in YD provokes a greater tax
audit probability in the wealth tax,  0 >
S
YD p ; while from the same situation, an increase
in SD brings about a smaller tax audit probability in that tax,  0 <
S
SD p . However, given




Y D D p p = . That is why, in expression [36], we have
used  0) (< −
D Y p  instead of 
D S p , while the super-index s has been suppressed for clarity
of exposition.
Expression [35] can be rewritten as follows:




R D − − + − − = − + − 1 1 1 α
                                                                                                                                      [35']
On the left-hand side, there appears the marginal benefit of tax compliance, and on the
right-hand side, the marginal cost of tax compliance. Precisely, the novelty with respect
to the case in which congruity is optimal is the additional marginal cost in which incurs
the taxpayer when increases tax compliance,  [] 0 > − − ) E ( U ) D ( U p
D Y . Incongruity
implies that an increase in YD causes a higher level of p, and so a loss of welfare since
U(E)>U(D). Instead, in expression [36], an increase in SD brings about a higher level of
welfare due to the decrease in p. Finally, note that as long as  ) F / ( S 1 < α , the second
summand of the left-hand side in expression [35'] has to be considered as a marginal
cost of tax compliance, and equally in expression [36] for  ) F / ( Y 1 < α .
Incongruity implicitly impedes SD=S and YD=Y from being an optimal strategy for the
taxpayer. Thus, in order to obtain an inner solution, the following conditions should
hold:
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which from now on, we assume that hold, and so an interior solution is obtained from
the taxpayer's maximization problem.
Comparative statics
We will skip the analytical comparative statics corresponding to the situation of
incongruity due to its difficulty, which is mainly caused by the cross-effects between
declared tax bases (YD and SD). Instead, we will carry it out by means of an exercise of
numerical simulations. However, before that, it might be useful to briefly analyze the
main difference with respect to that situation in which congruity is optimal. Thus, from
expression [35], we define the cost of incongruity, K, as
[] 0 > − ≡ ) D ( U ) E ( U p K
D Y                                                                                          [38]21
From this definition, it is easily verifiable that an increase either in  S α , tR, tP, F, pS or in
the sensitiveness of this latter variable with respect to incongruity
28 will produce an
increase in the cost of incongruity. Hence, leaving aside the corresponding income and
substitution effects, and being the initial situation one under which YD>SD+C, the rise in
K should produce a reduction in YD and/or an increase in SD, that is, a decrease in the
level of incongruity. Another new effect at work is a substitution effect between tax
bases declared. Given that they are independently decided, as long as one parameter
exclusively affects one tax base (e.g., the statutory tax rate), it will tend to promote an
increase/decrease in tax compliance of that tax base with respect to the other one.
Therefore, when interpreting the results of the numerical simulations, these two new
effects will have to be taken into account join with the income and substitution effects
already identified in the theoretical analysis.
3. Numerical simulations
The methodology of numerical simulations must be helpful in addressing some key
issues that were not totally solved by means of the theoretical analysis. Among those
issues are the following:
- Does the approach of considering tax evasion in interrelated taxes overcome, at least
partially, the paradox of tax evasion?
- Given this theoretical approach and considering the possibility of imperfect
collaboration between tax administrations, under which circumstances is incongruity
between tax returns an optimal choice for the taxpayer?; and finally,
- The numerical simulations should be helpful in solving the inconclusive results of the
analytical comparative statics.
In order to carry out the numerical simulations, we will employ the following well-
known iso-elastic utility function:
1   ,
Y











                                                 [39]
where  ) 0 (> σ is the coefficient of absolute risk-aversion, and YN is net income after
paying taxes, and in the presence of tax evasion also the corresponding fine per unit of
tax evaded. The greater the value of σ , the greater the degree of risk-aversion.
According to the economic literature, a reasonable value of this parameter is 1,8 (see
Karni and Schmeidler, 1990; Epstein, 1992).
The rest of values given to the basic parameters of the model are the following:
2   0,005; 0,5;   2 0   ; 8 0   1 = = = = = = F  t t ; , S , ; Y P R β
The numerical simulations do not pretend to replicate any real situation. That is why,
the value of the above parameters do not necessarily reflect those of any potentially
average taxpayer. However, the value of the tax audit probability will be obtained from
                                                          
28 Later on, in the exercises of numerical simulation, such sensitiveness will be denoted by h.22
the model in such a way that the equilibrium values of tax evasion ( S S Y Y D D /   and   /)
range within a reasonable interval, as we will check below.
In the presence of incongruity, e.g.  D D S ) ( Y > − β 1 , the tax audit probability of the
wealth tax will adopt the following function:
[] ) S ) ( Y ( h exp p p D D
S S − − × × = β 1                                                                                [40]
where h>0. In the presence of incongruity, the greater the value of h, the greater the
value of p
S above its normal level (
S p ). Similarly, in the case that  D D S ) ( Y < − β 1 ,
[] )) ( Y S ( h exp p p D D
Y Y β − − × × = 1                                                                               [40’]
In order to make significant in money terms the impact on net income of the wealth tax,
apart from the increase in wealth due to annual savings (S), we have assumed that at the
beginning of the fiscal year the taxpayer owned an initial amount of wealth, S0 (>0) (see
fn. 3). Therefore, leaving aside tax evasion, her budget constraint becomes as follows
P R D t ) S S ( t Y Y 0 + − −                                                                                                      [41]
Along all the numerical simulations, we will suppose that S0=2
29. Moreover, in order to
keep things as simple as possible and so focusing exclusively on the relationship
between S and Y, we will assume that the taxpayer always declares the whole amount of
her initial stock of wealth
30.
Paradox of tax evasion
The traditional analysis of tax evasion predicts very low levels of tax compliance, a
situation that does not seem to hold in practice. As we already said in the introduction,
in order to try to overcome such paradox, the literature on tax evasion has proposed
several alternative explanations. It is in this context that we propose a new one. Thus,
we postulate that considering tax evasion in interrelated taxes can, at least partially, help
to solve such paradox. In fact, intuitively it seems that as long as the tax instruments of
the interrelated taxes were (relatively) coordinated, they should positively interact with
each other making tax evasion less attractive (as we know, this is the idea which bases
the so-called “self-reinforcing penalty system of taxes” due to Shoup (1969)).
[TABLE 1a]
In Table 1a, we show the first results of this exercise of numerical simulation. We have
characterized a situation with tax evasion both in the personal income tax, YD=0,8 given
                                                          
29 This implies that the initial stock of wealth subject to taxation is twofold current income. That
seems a reasonable assumption, once we take into account that the tax law usually permits to
deduct a certain amount of money in the calculus of the tax base. Thus, S0 must be considered as
the initial stock of wealth once such amount of money has already beed deducted.
30 This assumption will prove extremely useful in the numerical simulations in order to isolate
an income effect.23
Y=1, and in the wealth tax, SD=0,16 given S=0,2, and in order to ease the comparison
with previous results of the literature, declared tax bases are congruous for  8 0, = β .
Next, we have obtained the value of the audit probability compatible with that level of
tax evasion, supposing a taxpayer that aims at maximizing the utility function [39].
However, the results of the numerical simulation certainly depend on the assumptions
regarding the context of tax evasion. Under the label Classical analysis, the model
employed of tax evasion coincides with the original model due to Allingham and
Sandmo (1972), and so each decision of tax evasion is considered separately. Hence, the
maximization problem is solved for each tax, such that p
Y and p
S are obtained given the
values of the basic parameters of the model
31. Since each decision is considered
separately, there is no reason to treat both events (auditing of the personal income tax
return and auditing of the wealth tax return) as mutually exclusive. That is why, the





rest of simulated situations, tax evasion in interrelated taxes is the behavior under
analysis (Interrelated Evasion), having analyzed, first, that situation under which
collaboration between tax administrations is perfect; and second, those situations under
which collaboration is imperfect.
In the Classical analysis, in order to ensure those cited levels of tax compliance, the
sum of tax audit probabilities has to be as high as 0,6625, while in the case of
Interrelated Evasion and perfect collaboration, that level is “only” 0,3212
32.
Nonetheless, as long as collaboration is imperfect, the tax audit probability might be
higher or lower than the value obtained in the Classical analysis (see also fn. 9). Hence,
taxes might interact negatively with each other producing a decrease in the level of tax
compliance as long as collaboration is imperfect. That impedes Shoup (1969)’s idea of
the “self-reinforcing penalty system of taxes” to be universal, since it depends on the
degree of collaboration between tax administrations. Thus, such negative possibility
does not come out when anyone of both tax administrations is carrying out the
maximum level of collaboration ( 1 = i α ), becoming then that case identical to the one of
perfect collaboration. Table 2a illustrates the same cases than Table 1a, but for a
situation of full tax compliance (i.e., 1 /   and   1 / = = S S Y Y D D ).
[TABLE 2a]
The values obtained of the tax audit probabilities that are shown in both tables are
certainly very high, obviously being highest in Table 2a. For example, Bernasconi
(1998), pp. 127-6, argues that in order to be accord with those in force in many
countries, the individual tax audit probabilities should range from 0,01 to 0,03, whereas
0,09 might be the average for USA taxpayers (Harris, 1987). Therefore, from the results
of our numerical simulations, we should conclude that Interrelated Evasion does not
solve the paradox of tax evasion, since in order to ensure full tax compliance, p (defined
as p
Y+p
S) has to be as high as 0,5 when collaboration is perfect (Table 2a), and 0,3212 to
guarantee a level of tax compliance of 80% (Table 1a). Nevertheless, there is another
                                                          
31 The method used to solve the system of non-linear equations is the so-called “Gauss-
Newton”.
32 As we know from the theoretical analysis, when collaboration between tax administrations is
perfect, we just have p, and so from the numerical simulations it is not possible to ascertain the
value of p
Y and p
S, but just p
Y+p
S.24
way to read our results, that is, comparing those absolute values with those obtained in
the  Classical analysis, 0,75 and 0,66, respectively. Thus, our approach might be
considered as a partial explanation to the paradox of tax evasion, since our tax audit
probabilities are around half those predicted by the Classical analysis.
[TABLE 1b]
[TABLE 2b]
Bernasconi (1998) also carried out an exercise of numerical simulation in order to
contrast whether his theory of over-weighted tax audit probabilities by part of the
taxpayers - which can be justified once different orders of risk aversion are
distinguished - was able to overcome the paradox of tax evasion. In order to compare
his results with ours, in Table 1b and Table 2b, we have modified the value of the basic
parameters of the previous numerical simulation. Now,  0,002 0,3; = = P R  t t  (which
might be considered as a low bound of the range of reasonable values of tP), and F=4,
which are the same values than those used by Bernasconi (1998) with the obvious
exception of tP
33. In this case, the equilibrium values of the tax auditing probabilities are
much lower. For instance, if we just pay attention to the value of p
Y, for levels of tax
compliance of 80%, when collaboration (between taxes or tax administrations) is
symmetric and above 0,5, we can see that it lies within a relatively reasonable interval
(0,096 to 0,0755), and in any case much lower than in the Classical analysis (0,1441)
34.
Moreover, in this latter analysis, p
S should be as high as 0,2499, while in the former it
should be between 0,1398 and 0,0820. In fact, although this result does not appear in
Table 1b, in the case of Interrelated Evasion, a level of tax compliance of 60% is
compatible with auditing probabilities in each tax as low as 0,03. Additionally, the
necessary values of tax auditing probabilities is decreasing in S0  (in our case,
exclusively due to an income effect), so for big fortunes (i.e., those taxpayers with a
high ratio S0/Y), the tax auditing probabilities should be even lower than the values
shown in tables
35.
                                                          
33 In fact, Bernasconi (1998) set F=3. However, he expressed net income when the taxpayer is
audited as
) Y Y ( t ' F Yt Y D R R − − −
Therefore, given our different way of expressing net income, it is obvious that in our case
F=F’+1.That is why, using F=4, and given the rest of values of the basic parameters, we are
exactly replicating Bernasconi (1998)’s simulations.
34 Note that the tax audit probabilities qualified by Bernasconi (1998) as reasonable, which
range from 0,01 to 0,03, are an average for the whole set of taxpayers. Hence, these average
values should be perfectly compatible with point values much higher (and lower). In this sense,
it could be the case that those taxpayers that submit a wealth tax return were audited in the
personal income tax more often than any other taxpayer, that is, it could be the case that their
“normal” tax audit probability (before considering the possibility of incongruity between tax
bases) were above those average values. Once we take into account this possibility, a tax
auditing probability around 0,07 or even slightly above might not be too far from reality.
35 For instance, for a taxpayer which initial stock of wealth (S0) is 100, maintaining the rest of
values equal to those in Table 1b, p
Y+p
S=0,1083. However, given that the wealth tax is a25
On the whole, from the results of our numerical simulations, we should conclude that
considering tax evasion in interrelated taxes permits to partially overcome the paradox
of tax evasion, since reasonable levels of tax evasion are compatible with relatively low
values of the tax auditing probabilities. However, it is very important to note that such
result is only valid as long as there is an important degree of collaboration between tax
administrations.
Incongruity
The consideration of tax evasion in interrelated taxes can produce an interesting result.
As long as collaboration between tax auditors responsible for each tax is not perfect, the
tax bases declared in each tax return might not be congruous. This result has already
been shown in the theoretical part of the paper. However, the numerical simulations
should still provide us more information. In particular, first, they should be useful in
indicating which situation is more likely,  D D S ) ( Y
>
<
− β 1 , and second, which
combination of values of the basic parameters of the model can produce incongruity.
The benchmark case will be that of Table 1a in which for  75 0, S Y = = α α , 1848 0, p
Y =
and 2296 0, p
S =  (i.e., p
Y/p
S=0,8049)
36, and tax bases are congruous for β =0,8. From
these initial values, we ask which new combination of tax audit probabilities should
hold in order incongruity becomes an optimal choice for the taxpayer. In Table 3, first,
we detect those situations under which YD(1-β )>SD. As expected, maintaining constant
the rest of parameters, that type of situation is only compatible with a relatively much
greater level of tax enforcement of the tax administration responsible for the personal
income tax (recall that in this situation p
S has to be calculated by means of expression
[40]). Moreover, this difference in the relative degree of tax enforcement has to be
greater, the greater the level of h. Second, as Table 3 also shows, under the reverse
situation,  YD(1-β )<SD, those differences – now, in favor of p
S, while p
Y has to be
calculated by means of expression [40’] - have to be even much more acute. Therefore,
in order the taxpayer finds it optimal to be incongruent, keeping the rest of tax
parameters unchanged, there must be great differences in the relative level of tax
enforcement, especially in the situation under which YD(1-β )<SD.
[TABLE 3]
Next, in Table 4, we have carried out the same exercise, but now in order to detect
likely differences in the degree of collaboration. Again, in order YD(1-β )>SD becomes an
optimal strategy for the taxpayer, the endogenous parameter concerning the personal
income tax,  S α , has to be greater than the one concerning the wealth tax,  Y α . This
                                                                                                                                                                         




36 As we already know, these values seem quite high in comparison with those in force in many
countries. However, for the purposes of this section, this is not an important issue, since what
we are really interested in is in the relative differences of tax enforcement necessary in order
incongruity becomes an optimal strategy for the taxpayer. In any case, note that as long as we
set F=4 as Bernasconi (1998) did (see also fn. 33), the tax audit probabilities would be much
lower, p
Y=0,0821 and p
S=0,1001 (see Table 1b).26
difference has also to be greater, the greater the value of h. Curiously, the smaller the
value of  Y α , the greater the value of  S α . This result, which might seem counterintuitive,
can be easily understood from expression [24]. In this expression, keeping the rest of
parameters unchanged, a decrease in  Y α  should certainly permit a smaller value of  S α
such that the sign of the inequality could still hold. However, note that as long as  Y α
decreases, marginal utility in state A decreases as well, while marginal utility in state D
remains unchanged. Thus, the combination of those facts might make necessary an even
greater value of  S α . Finally, in Table 4, we can check that the situation YD(1-β )<SD is
not compatible with differences in the degree of tax enforcement that remain within the
boundaries of  Y α , since both for  S α =0,75 and  S α =0,25, the value of  Y α  in those cases
should be above 1.
[TABLE 4]
In conclusion, the results of these numerical simulations confirm those already obtained
in the theoretical analysis. That is, incongruity as an optimal strategy for the taxpayer is
only possible as long as the level of tax parameters of each tax is sufficiently different.
Moreover, these differences have to be more acute, the more sensitive the tax audit
probabilities to the degree of incongruity. From the analysis of the numerical
simulations, it is possible to infer that incongruity is much more likely as long as there
are differences in the degree of collaboration (which not only produces a substitution
effect between states, but also an income effect), since otherwise the differences in the
tax audit probabilities probably have to be too sharp in order they can hold in practice.
In any case, note that if we focus either on the ratio p
Y/p
S or on the ratio α
S/α
Y, the more
likely situation is that one under which YD(1-β )>SD. Precisely, this is the situation that
will be analyzed in the following exercises of comparative statics.
Comparative statics
The exercise of numerical simulation will prove extremely useful in order to analyze the
results of the comparative statics in the case of incongruity. However, before that
exercise, and although all the signs of the comparative statics are perfectly clear from
the theoretical analysis, firstly, in Table 5, we show the results in the case of
Interrelated Evasion and perfect collaboration such that YD(1-β )=SD. In the first column,
there appear the values of the variable on which the exercise of comparative statics is
based; in the second and third column, the equilibrium values of the tax bases declared;
in the fourth one, the percentage of tax compliance, while in the fifth column that
percentage is expressed in money terms with respect to the amount of money that would
be collected in the presence of full tax compliance
37; finally, in the sixth column, we
have calculated expected net income, after paying taxes and, in the presence of tax
evasion, the corresponding fine per unit of tax evaded
38.
[TABLE 5]
In fact, the only new results that appear in Table 5 are the comparative statics with
                                                          
37 That is, (((SD+S0)× tP)+ (YD× tR))/ (((S+S0) × tP)+ (Y× tR)).
38 Note that due to S0>0, nothing impedes in some cases net income to be negative. 27
respect to σ  and S0. In both cases, the sign is also positive. An increase in S0 produces a
reduction in net income in all the states, which given the assumption of decreasing risk
aversion forces the taxpayer to increase tax compliance. Obviously, an increase in σ
automatically generates the same reaction by the taxpayer.
In the Appendix, we have included the whole set of numerical simulations carried out
for a situation under which YD(1-β )>SD. The structure of the tables is the same than in
Table 5, with the exception of two new definitions. First, the ratio between pS and the
“normal” level of p
S, 
S p ; and second, the level of incongruity, ((1-β )-(SD/YD))/(1-β ).
The values of the basic parameters used in the numerical simulations make that
marginal income in states A and D are always positive. Thus, on the one hand, the
income effect detected in the theoretical analysis will always point out in favor of an
increase in tax compliance. On the other hand, a substitution effect always had a clear
impact in favor of increasing tax compliance with the exception of those cases in which
tR or tP varied. This latter ambiguity was caused by potential discrepancies in the level
of collaboration between tax administrations (see, e.g., fn. 26). In the numerical
simulations, we will check to what extent that potential situation can produce a decrease
in tax compliance. These basic results apply in the case of congruity. Nonetheless, in the
case of incongruity, due to cross-effects between SD and YD, it might be the case that
although global tax compliance is increasing, one of both declared tax bases is
decreasing. In any case, recall that it also has to be taken into account the effect that
occurs through variations in the cost of incongruity, K, as long as h>0.
As can be checked from tables A.5 and A.4, an increase in h or in p
S, respectively,
provokes a higher level of unweighted tax compliance through a small reduction in YD
and an important increase in SD. In both cases, the cost of incongruity has augmented,
calling for an increase in the ratio SD/YD. Moreover, the increase in that cost has
occurred through an increase in the effective tax audit probability of the tax
administration responsible for the wealth tax, making tax compliance in that tax
relatively more attractive. Therefore, both effects point out in the same direction of
increasing SD over YD. Obviously, that increase is greater, the greater the value of α Y.
In Table A.10, it is interesting to analyze the consequences of an increase in S0. Given
that S0 is fully declared, only an income effect is at work (see fn. 30). Such an income
effect causes an increase in the level of tax compliance weighted by the relative
importance of the tax burden of each tax (in the table, denoted by (SD+YD)r). This
increase in the level of tax compliance is achieved by means of a decrease in the ratio
SD/YD. Hence, this result will be useful in those comparative static analysis where an
income effect arises.
An increase in α Y (Table A.8) or in α S (Table A.7) provokes the same effect both on
total tax compliance and on each one of the tax bases declared than in the case of an
increase in h or in p
S. However, the reasoning is not exactly the same than the one given
above. On the one hand, an increase in α Y does not modify the cost of incongruity, since
it does not change the value of marginal income neither in state D nor in state E.
However, it certainly makes more attractive increasing SD with respect to YD, while at
the same time generates an income effect in favor of increasing total tax compliance (in
particular, as we already know that occurs through increases in YD). Thus, in this case, a
substitution effect between tax bases prevails over an income effect. On the other hand,28
an increase in α S makes incongruity more costly, so pointing out in the direction of
increasing the ratio SD/YD. But, at the same time, both an income effect and a
substitution effect between tax bases point out in the contrary direction. Hence, in this
case the increase in the cost of incongruity overcomes the impact of the two latter
effects.
In the rest of cases, the comparative statics points out in the direction of increasing YD
and decreasing SD. In Table A.3, we can check how an increase in p
Y causes a
substitution effect in favor of increasing tax compliance, and in particular decreasing the
ratio SD/YD, while the cost of incongruity remains unchanged. The results concerning F
are shown in Table A.9. An increase in F intensifies the cost of incongruity, so
promoting a rise in the ratio SD/YD. However, a substitution and an income effect in
favor of increasing tax compliance dominate in the sense that this increase in tax
compliance is achieved through a reduction in the ratio SD/YD.
Finally, an increase in any one of the statutory tax rates generates an income effect that
as we know favors a decrease in SD/YD, although total weighted tax compliance
increases (tables A.1 and A.2). Moreover, in both cases, the cost of incongruity raises,
so promoting an increase in SD/YD. Given that the degree of collaboration between tax
administrations is quite similar, we do not expect a substitution effect in favor of
decreasing total tax compliance (see expressions [29] and [30]), but only a relative
increase in the level of tax compliance of the tax base that has suffered an increase in its
tax burden (i.e., a substitution effect between tax bases declared). Therefore, in the
particular case of tR, the decrease in SD/YD  is consequence of the domination of an
income effect and a substitution effect between tax bases over the increase in the cost of
incongruity; while in the case of tP an income effect prevails over the other two effects.
4. Conclusions
The objective of this paper has been analyzing the consequences of considering the
decision over tax evasion as a decision in which interrelated taxes (e.g., at the individual
level, personal income tax and wealth tax, but a similar analysis could also be applied to
the case of corporations, given the evident relationship between the VAT and the
corporate tax) interact with each other, and so the optimal level of tax compliance from
the point of view of the taxpayer might differ with respect to those analysis in which tax
evasion is considered tax by tax. In particular, the source of interaction comes out from
the information available to the tax administration as long as it compares the tax bases
declared in each tax return. Given the evident relationship between tax bases (e.g., the
increase in the wealth tax base with respect to the previous fiscal year should be a
reasonable proportion of current income), that comparison should make evident any
incongruity, and so it could be a hint to start a process of auditing. In the paper, such
incongruity produces an increase in the auditing probability of that tax which tax base
has been supposedly under-declared. However, given the possibility that those
interrelated taxes were audited by different tax administrations or within a tax
administration by different departments, we have also analyzed those situations under
which collaboration between different tax administrations or between different
departments of the same tax administration is imperfect. In the extreme case in which
collaboration is null, that means that each tax administration might certainly obtain
valuable information from comparing tax returns, but it does not make any effort in
enforcing tax obligations on behalf of the other tax administration/department when29
carrying out its own tax audits. On the contrary, perfect collaboration exactly replicates
that situation in which there exists just one tax administration or just one department
responsible for both taxes.
The idea of interaction between taxes as a means of reinforcing tax compliance is due to
Shoup (1969), but it had never been formally developed. Moreover, taking into account
the possibility of imperfect collaboration can certainly affect the originally expected
results. In the case of perfect collaboration between tax administrations, our theoretical
analysis shows that congruity between tax bases is the only optimal decision for the
taxpayer, while the results of the comparative statics do not vary from the classical
analysis (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972; Yitzhaki, 1974). In that context, as expected,
interrelated taxes slightly reinforce with each other making possible to achieve higher
levels of tax compliance maintaining the level of tax enforcement constant
39. However,
that result –which has been obtained from an exercise of numerical simulation - might
reverse for low levels of collaboration. This type of analysis has also permitted us to
shed some new light on the paradox of tax evasion. Also employing the methodology of
numerical simulations, we have shown that using values of the penalty per unit of tax
evaded equal to those previously used by the literature (Bernasconi, 1998), it is possible
to obtain relatively reasonable values of the levels of tax enforcement compatible with
reasonable values of tax compliance. Nonetheless, again that result is crucially
dependent on the existence of high levels of collaboration between tax administrations.
At least, interrelated tax evasion might be considered as a partial explanation to the
paradox of tax evasion.
Certainly, the degree of collaboration between tax administrations becomes crucial in
the results concerning tax evasion in interrelated taxes. In fact, when collaboration is
imperfect, our theoretical analysis has shown that incongruity might be an optimal
choice for a rational taxpayer. The direction of the incongruity depends on the relative
importance of the tax parameters of each tax. Thus, we should expect relatively lower
levels of tax compliance in those taxes which tax parameters (including the tax auditing
probability and the level of collaboration of the other tax administration) are relatively
less important. For example, in the case of the personal income tax and the wealth tax,
we expect the level of tax compliance to be more important in the former tax than in the
latter
40.
The results of the comparative statics are also crucially affected by the degree of
collaboration. In the case of imperfect collaboration, the theoretical analysis does not
provide clear-cut results, and the methodology of numerical simulations becomes
fundamental to ascertain its effects. Moreover, this analysis depends on whether
congruity or incongruity is the optimal decision of the taxpayer. Our numerical
simulations have been done for the probably most interesting case, that is, that one in
which incongruity is optimal. As a general result, it is worth mentioning that there is not
                                                          
39 For example, observe in Table 1a, 1b, 2a and 2b that in the presence of perfect collaboration,
lower levels of tax enforcement are compatible with equal levels of tax compliance in the
situation of interrelated tax evasion and under the classical analysis. Thus, keeping the same
level of tax enforcement, in the former situation tax compliance will be greater than in the latter
one.
40 For example, although it does not appear in Table 4, the impossibility of YD(1-β )<SD is
independent of the level of S0. That is, even for very big values of  S0, α Y is still above 1.30
any tax policy that promotes tax compliance in both taxes at the same time.
Additionally, although as we said in the introduction our aim is not characterizing the
optimal policies of a tax administration, it is also interesting to stress that in some
occasions the incentives to carry out certain policies by a tax administration are null.
For instance, we have obtained that as long as the tax administration responsible for the
personal income tax strengthens its collaboration with the other tax administration, the
level of tax compliance in that tax decreases, while it increases in the wealth tax (see
Table A.8). Thus, we should observe very low levels of collaboration on that tax
administration’s side. Just the reverse incentives hold for the other tax administration
(see Table A.7). Hence, this analysis predicts an asymmetric degree of collaboration,
null by part of the tax administration responsible for the personal income tax and
maximum by part of the tax administration responsible for the wealth tax. Finally, the
presence of imperfect collaboration, contrary to the case of perfect collaboration, might
produce negative externalities between tax administrations. For instance, an increase in
the statutory tax rate of the personal income tax promotes a higher level of tax
compliance in that tax, but at the same time a decrease in the level of tax compliance in
the wealth tax. On the whole, all these results call for an integration of all the processes
of tax auditing, or as long as the responsibilities of auditing for different taxes are
assigned to different layers of government, they call for a high level of mutual
collaboration between tax administrations.31
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∆ SD>0      ∆ SD>0 ∆ SD>,<0 ∆ SD>,<0
S α Y α35






Y ∪   p
S





Y ∪   p
S
Perfect collaboration n.a. n.a. 0,3212
Imperfect collaboration
Symmetric Collaboration
α Y=α S=0 0,3219 0,6781 1
α Y=α S=0,25 0,2596 0,4664 0,7260
α Y=α S=0,5 0,2163 0,3261 0,5424
α Y=α S=0,75 0,1848 0,2296 0,4144
α Y=α S=0,9 0,1696 0,1855 0,3551
Asymmetric Collaboration
α Y=1; α S<1 0,3212 0 0,3212
α S=1; α Y<1 0 0,3212 0,3212






Y ∪   p
S





Y ∪   p
S
Perfect collaboration n.a. n.a. 0,5
Imperfect collaboration
Symmetric Collaboration
α Y=α S=0 0,5 0,5 1
α Y=α S=0,25 0,4 0,4 0,8
α Y=α S=0,5 0,3331 0,3331 0,6662
α Y=α S=0,75 0,2857 0,2857 0,5714
α Y=α S=0,9 0,2632 0,2632 0,5264
Asymmetric Collaboration
α Y=1; α S<1 0,5 0 0,5
α S=1; α Y<1 00 , 5 0 , 5
         n.a.: non-available36
PARADOX OF TAX EVASION






Y ∪   p
S





Y ∪   p
S
Perfect collaboration n.a. n.a. 0,1434
Imperfect collaboration
Symmetric Collaboration
α Y=α S=0 0,1435 0,2853 0,4288
α Y=α S=0,25 0,1152 0,1973 0,3125
α Y=α S=0,5 0,0960 0,1398 0,2358
α Y=α S=0,75 0,0821 0,1001 0,1822
α Y=α S=0,9 0,0755 0,0820 0,1575
Asymmetric Collaboration
α Y=1; α S<1 0,1434 0 0,1434
α S=1; α Y<1 0 0,1434 0,1434






Y ∪   p
S





Y ∪   p
S
Perfect collaboration n.a. n.a. 0,25
Imperfect collaboration
Symmetric Collaboration
α Y=α S=0 0,2500 0,2500 0,5000
α Y=α S=0,25 0,2000 0,2000 0,4000
α Y=α S=0,5 0,1667 0,1667 0,3334
α Y=α S=0,75 0,1429 0,1429 0,2858
α Y=α S=0,9 0,1316 0,1316 0,2632
Asymmetric Collaboration
α Y=1; α S<1 0,2500 0 0,2500
α S=1; α Y<1 0 0,2500 0,2500




Y= 0,1848;  p
S=0,2296)
D D S ) ( Y > − β 1







h=0,5 0,3118 0,0159 0,0160 19,422
h=1,5 0,3181 0,0054 0,0056 56,604
h=10 0,3209 0,0007 0,0008 372,824







h=0,5 0,3117 0,0157 0,0160 19,426
h=1,5 0,3179 0,0053 0,0056 56,668
h=10 0,3208 0,0006 0,0009 373,249







h=0,5 0,3116 0,0155 0,0160 19,448
h=1,5 0,3178 0,0051 0,0056 56,732
h=10 0,3207 0,0005 0,0009 373,730
D D S ) ( Y < − β 1







h=0,5 0,0091 0,0092 0,4590 49,842
h=1,5 0,0031 0,0032 0,4708 146,661
h=10 0,0004 0,0005 0,4762 968,198
YD=0,6; SD=0,16; α Y=0,75; α S=0,75
pY pYF pS pS/pYF
h=0,5 0,0062 0,0063 0,4008 63,613
h=1,5 0,0021 0,0022 0,4107 187,425
h=10 0,0002 0,0003 0,4152 1239,826







h=0,5 0,0043 0,0044 0,3442 78,031
h=1,5 0,0014 0,0015 0,3530 229,826
h=10 0,0001 0,0002 0,3571 1520,698
p
YF and p
SF have been calculated using expressions [40'] and [40], respectively.
Table 4
(Benchmark: α Y=0,75;α S =0,75)
D D S ) ( Y > − β 1
YD=0,8; SD=0,14; p
Y= 0,1848; p
S=0,2296 YD=0,8; SD=0,12; p
Y= 0,1848; p
S=0,2296
α Y=0,75 α Y=0,25 α Y=0,75 α Y=0,25
α S α S α S α S
h=0,5 0,7549 0,7555 0,7500 0,7508
h=1,5 0,7657 0,7663 0,7520 0,7527
h=10 0,8919 0,8925 0,8098 0,8105
D D S ) ( Y < − β 1
YD=0,7; SD=0,16; p
Y= 0,1848; p
S=0,2296 YD=0,6; SD=0,16; p
Y= 0,1848; p
S=0,2296
α S=0,75 α S=0,25 α S=0,75 α S=0,25
α Y α Y α Y α Y
h=0,5 >1 >1 >1 >1
h=1,5 >1 >1 >1 >1




YD SD SD+YD (SD+YD)r E(YN)
tR
0,1675 0,0010 0,0002 0,0010 0,0570 0,8820
0,3000 0,5310 0,1062 0,5309 0,5460 0,8415
0,5000 0,8000 0,1600 0,8000 0,8039 0,5757
0,6000 0,8674 0,1735 0,8673 0,8695 0,4169
0,7000 0,9155 0,1831 0,9155 0,9167 0,2508
0,9890 1,0000 0,2000 1,0000 1,0000 -0,2505
tP
0,0001 0,7952 0,1590 0,7952 0,7953 0,5875
0,0050 0,8000 0,1600 0,8000 0,8039 0,5757
0,0100 0,8049 0,1610 0,8049 0,8124 0,5637
0,0500 0,8433 0,1687 0,8433 0,8690 0,4673
0,1500 0,9343 0,1869 0,9343 0,9580 0,2245
0,2273 1,0000 0,2000 1,0000 1,0000 0,0350
p
0,0010 0,0651 0,0130 0,0652 0,0834 0,9564
0,0100 0,1650 0,0330 0,1650 0,1813 0,8993
0,0400 0,3091 0,0618 0,3092 0,3227 0,8099
0,0700 0,3988 0,0798 0,3988 0,4105 0,7536
0,1300 0,5277 0,1055 0,5277 0,5369 0,6777
0,5000 1,0000 0,2000 1,0000 1,0000 0,5880
F
1,310 0,0217 0,0043 0,0218 0,0409 0,7767
1,500 0,4333 0,0867 0,4333 0,4444 0,6986
2,000 0,8000 0,1600 0,8000 0,8039 0,5757
2,250 0,8763 0,1753 0,8763 0,8787 0,5267
2,500 0,9273 0,1855 0,9273 0,9287 0,4805
3,113 1,0000 0,2000 1,0000 1,0000 0,3734
σ
0,001 0,0240 0,0048 0,0239 0,0278 0,6654
0,751 0,5504 0,1101 0,5503 0,8642 0,6046
1,800 0,8000 0,1600 0,8000 0,9614 0,5757
3,000 0,8789 0,1758 0,8789 0,9812 0,5666
4,500 0,9190 0,1838 0,9190 0,9891 0,5620
12,000 0,9696 0,1939 0,9696 0,9967 0,5561
S0
0 0,7959 0,1592 0,7959 0,7959 0,5862
5 0,8061 0,1612 0,8062 0,8153 0,5600
10 0,8164 0,1633 0,8163 0,8330 0,5338
20 0,8368 0,1674 0,8368 0,8640 0,4815
60 0,9186 0,1837 0,9186 0,9491 0,2720




tR SD YD SD+YD (SD+YD)r S S p / p Incongruity E(YN)
73 0, Y = α
0,41 0,1415 0,7101 0,7097 0,7169 1,0007 0,0035 0,6316
0,46 0,0936 0,7647 0,7153 0,7691 1,0931 0,3881 0,5778
0,50 0,0499 0,8006 0,7088 0,8034 1,1799 0,6887 0,5348
0,54 0,0011 0,8312 0,6935 0,8328 1,2812 0,9937 0,4918
0,57 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
0,61 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
75 0, Y = α
0,41 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
0,46 0,1438 0,7641 0,7566 0,7690 1,0135 0,0587 0,5778
0,50 0,1000 0,8000 0,7500 0,8033 1,0942 0,3749 0,5349
0,54 0,0511 0,8306 0,7348 0,8327 1,1884 0,6925 0,4919
0,57 0,0037 0,8540 0,7148 0,8550 1,2848 0,9782 0,4543
0,61 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
77 0, Y = α
0,41 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
0,46 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
0,50 0,1544 0,7993 0,7948 0,8032 1,0082 0,0340 0,5349
0,54 0,1054 0,8300 0,7795 0,8326 1,0952 0,3653 0,4919
0,57 0,0579 0,8534 0,7594 0,8550 1,1844 0,6609 0,4543
0,61 0,0056 0,8741 0,7332 0,8748 1,2890 0,9679 0,4167
        n.s.: no-solution
Table A.2.
tP SD YD SD+YD (SD+YD)r S S p / p Incongruity E(YN)
73 0, Y = α
0,0043 0,1485 0,7987 0,7893 0,8020 1,0170 0,0703 0,5351
0,0046 0,1043 0,7995 0,7532 0,8026 1,0870 0,3476 0,5350
0,0050 0,0512 0,8006 0,7098 0,8034 1,1776 0,6805 0,5348
0,0053 0,0119 0,8014 0,6778 0,8040 1,2492 0,9256 0,5347
0,0058 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
0,0063 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
75 0, Y = α
0,0043 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
0,0046 0,1546 0,7989 0,7946 0,8025 1,0078 0,0324 0,5350
0,0050 0,1000 0,8000 0,7500 0,8033 1,0942 0,3749 0,5349
0,0053 0,1013 0,8000 0,7511 0,8033 1,0920 0,3667 0,5349
0,0058 0,0620 0,8008 0,7190 0,8039 1,1587 0,6130 0,5347
0,0063 0,0034 0,8022 0,6713 0,8049 1,2657 0,9789 0,5345
77 0, Y = α
0,0043 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
0,0046 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
0,0050 0,1557 0,7993 0,7958 0,8032 1,0062 0,0258 0,5349
0,0053 0,1163 0,8001 0,7637 0,8038 1,0678 0,2733 0,5348
0,0058 0,0575 0,8015 0,7158 0,8048 1,1667 0,6413 0,5345
0,0063 0,0038 0,8028 0,6723 0,8058 1,2650 0,9760 0,5343
        n.s.: no-solution40
Table A.3.
pY SD YD SD+YD (SD+YD)r S S p / p Incongruity E(YN)
73 0, Y = α
0,288 0,1524 0,7628 0,7627 0,7674 1,0003 0,0011 0,5485
0,302 0,1058 0,7807 0,7387 0,7845 1,0785 0,3226 0,5418
0,318 0,0492 0,8008 0,7083 0,8036 1,1810 0,6926 0,5347
0,330 0,0040 0,8158 0,6832 0,8178 1,2696 0,9754 0,5299
0,343 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
0,355 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
75 0, Y = α
0,288 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
0,302 0,1559 0,7801 0,7800 0,7844 1,0001 0,0005 0,5418
0,318 0,0994 0,8002 0,7497 0,8035 1,0953 0,3790 0,5348
0,330 0,0542 0,8151 0,7244 0,8177 1,1774 0,6677 0,5299
0,343 0,0019 0,8312 0,6943 0,8329 1,2796 0,9886 0,5251
0,355 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
77 0, Y = α
0,288 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
0,302 0,1538 0,7995 0,7944 0,8034 1,0092 0,0382 0,5348
0,318 0,1086 0,8145 0,7692 0,8176 1,0849 0,3334 0,5300
0,330 0,0563 0,8305 0,7390 0,8327 1,1790 0,6609 0,5252
0,343 0,0044 0,8452 0,7080 0,8466 1,2802 0,9741 0,5211
0,355 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
   n.s.: no-solution
Table A.4.
pS SD YD SD+YD (SD+YD)r S S p / p Incongruity E(YN)
73 0, Y = α
0,0041 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
0,0044 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
0,0048 0,0080 0,8009 0,6741 0,8033 1,2563 0,9498 0,5349
0,0051 0,0473 0,8006 0,7066 0,8034 1,1844 0,7046 0,5348
0,0056 0,1079 0,8002 0,7568 0,8036 1,0814 0,3259 0,5347
0,0059 0,1417 0,8000 0,7848 0,8037 1,0279 0,1145 0,5347
75 0, Y = α
0,0041 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
0,0044 0,0017 0,8007 0,6687 0,8030 1,2682 0,9891 0,5350
0,0048 0,0582 0,8003 0,7153 0,8032 1,1652 0,6367 0,5349
0,0051 0,0975 0,8000 0,7479 0,8033 1,0984 0,3909 0,5349
0,0056 0,1581 0,7996 0,7981 0,8035 1,0027 0,0114 0,5348
0,0059 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
77 0, Y = α
0,0041 0,0102 0,8004 0,6755 0,8028 1,2520 0,9361 0,5351
0,0044 0,0561 0,8000 0,7134 0,8029 1,1687 0,6496 0,5350
0,0048 0,1125 0,7996 0,7602 0,8031 1,0737 0,2964 0,5349
0,0051 0,1519 0,7993 0,7927 0,8032 1,0121 0,0500 0,5349
0,0056 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
0,0059 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
   n.s.: no-solution41
Table A.5.
h SD YD SD+YD (SD+YD)r S S p / p Incongruity E(YN)
73 0, Y = α
1,24 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
1,33 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
1,41 0,0007 0,8012 0,6683 0,8035 1,2523 0,9956 0,5348
1,51 0,0548 0,8005 0,7128 0,8034 1,1723 0,6576 0,5348
1,64 0,1117 0,7998 0,7597 0,8033 1,0823 0,3016 0,5349
1,77 0,1570 0,7992 0,7969 0,8031 1,0050 0,0177 0,5349
75 0, Y = α
1,24 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
1,33 0,0055 0,8012 0,6722 0,8035 1,2285 0,9659 0,5348
1,41 0,0540 0,8006 0,7121 0,8034 1,1615 0,6630 0,5348
1,51 0,1046 0,7999 0,7538 0,8033 1,0872 0,3459 0,5349
1,64 0,1577 0,7993 0,7975 0,8032 1,0035 0,0134 0,5349
1,77 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
77 0, Y = α
1,24 0,0058 0,8012 0,6724 0,8035 1,2111 0,9641 0,5348
1,33 0,0666 0,8004 0,7225 0,8034 1,1324 0,5839 0,5348
1,41 0,1117 0,7999 0,7597 0,8033 1,0704 0,3016 0,5349
1,51 0,1587 0,7993 0,7983 0,8032 1,0017 0,0071 0,5349
1,64 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
1,77 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
   n.s.: no-solution
Table A.6.
σσσσ SD YD SD+YD (SD+YD)r S S p / p Incongruity E(YN)
73 0, Y = α
1,50 0,1518 0,7605 0,7603 0,7652 1,0005 0,0020 0,5418
1,64 0,1022 0,7809 0,7359 0,7847 1,0843 0,3456 0,5383
1,79 0,0530 0,7995 0,7104 0,8024 1,1739 0,6685 0,5350
1,96 0,0015 0,8172 0,6823 0,8192 1,2749 0,9907 0,5319
2,14 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
2,35 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
75 0, Y = α
1,50 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
1,64 0,1525 0,7803 0,7773 0,7846 1,0054 0,0230 0,5383
1,79 0,1032 0,7989 0,7517 0,8022 1,0886 0,3543 0,5350
1,96 0,0516 0,8166 0,7235 0,8191 1,1825 0,6843 0,5320
2,14 0,0012 0,8325 0,6948 0,8341 1,2813 0,9927 0,5292
2,35 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
77 0, Y = α
1,50 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
1,64 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
1,79 0,1576 0,7982 0,7965 0,8021 1,0031 0,0129 0,5351
1,96 0,1059 0,8160 0,7682 0,8190 1,0898 0,3514 0,5320
2,14 0,0554 0,8318 0,7393 0,8340 1,1811 0,6671 0,5292
2,35 0,0013 0,8474 0,7073 0,8487 1,2869 0,9922 0,5265
   n.s.: no-solution42
Table A.7.
S α SD YD SD+YD (SD+YD)r S S p / p Incongruity E(YN)
73 0, Y = α
0,62 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
0,67 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
0,71 0,0064 0,8008 0,6727 0,8032 1,2594 0,9599 0,5349
0,75 0,0499 0,8006 0,7088 0,8034 1,1799 0,6887 0,5348
0,80 0,1024 0,8004 0,7523 0,8037 1,0904 0,3606 0,5347
0,85 0,1531 0,8002 0,7944 0,8040 1,0105 0,0434 0,5346
75 0, Y = α
0,62 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
0,67 0,0113 0,8004 0,6764 0,8029 1,2500 0,9294 0,5350
0,71 0,0564 0,8002 0,7138 0,8031 1,1682 0,6477 0,5349
0,75 0,1000 0,8000 0,7500 0,8033 1,0942 0,3749 0,5349
0,80 0,1527 0,7997 0,7938 0,8036 1,0109 0,0450 0,5348
0,85 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
77 0, Y = α
0,62 0,0064 0,8001 0,6721 0,8025 1,2592 0,9602 0,5351
0,67 0,0653 0,7998 0,7209 0,8028 1,1526 0,5919 0,5350
0,71 0,1106 0,7996 0,7584 0,8030 1,0768 0,3085 0,5350
0,75 0,1544 0,7993 0,7948 0,8032 1,0082 0,0340 0,5349
0,80 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
0,85 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
   n.s.: no-solution
Table A.8.
Y α SD YD SD+YD (SD+YD)r S S p / p Incongruity E(YN)
73 0, S = α
0,700 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
0,710 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
0,720 0,0047 0,8010 0,6714 0,8034 1,2627 0,9708 0,5348
0,764 0,1159 0,7996 0,7629 0,8031 1,0683 0,2754 0,5349
0,770 0,1327 0,7994 0,7768 0,8031 1,0417 0,1702 0,5349
0,777 0,1528 0,7992 0,7933 0,8031 1,0106 0,0439 0,5349
75 0, S = α
0,700 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
0,710 0,0034 0,8012 0,6704 0,8035 1,2653 0,9791 0,5348
0,720 0,0262 0,8009 0,6893 0,8035 1,2226 0,8366 0,5348
0,764 0,1376 0,7995 0,7809 0,8032 1,0340 0,1394 0,5349
0,770 0,1544 0,7993 0,7948 0,8032 1,0082 0,0340 0,5349
0,777 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
77 0, S = α
0,700 0,0024 0,8014 0,6698 0,8037 1,2672 0,9850 0,5347
0,710 0,0245 0,8011 0,6880 0,8036 1,2258 0,8472 0,5347
0,720 0,0474 0,8008 0,7068 0,8036 1,1844 0,7043 0,5348
0,764 0,1590 0,7994 0,7987 0,8033 1,0013 0,0055 0,5348
0,770 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
0,777 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
   n.s.: no-solution43
Table A.9.
F SD YD SD+YD (SD+YD)r S S p / p Incongruity E(YN)
73 0, S = α
1,86 0,1444 0,7373 0,7347 0,7424 1,0046 0,0210 0,5519
1,93 0,0984 0,7712 0,7246 0,7751 1,0874 0,3622 0,5426
2,00 0,0499 0,8006 0,7088 0,8034 1,1799 0,6887 0,5348
2,06 0,0061 0,8229 0,6909 0,8248 1,2683 0,9627 0,5292
2,13 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
2,19 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
75 0, S = α
1,86 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
1,93 0,1486 0,7706 0,7660 0,7750 1,0083 0,0359 0,5426
2,00 0,1000 0,8000 0,7500 0,8033 1,0942 0,3749 0,5349
2,06 0,0563 0,8223 0,7322 0,8247 1,1762 0,6580 0,5292
2,13 0,0025 0,8455 0,7067 0,8469 1,2839 0,9853 0,5236
2,19 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
77 0, S = α
1,86 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
1,93 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
2,00 0,1544 0,7993 0,7948 0,8032 1,0082 0,0340 0,5349
2,06 0,1106 0,8216 0,7769 0,8246 1,0839 0,3268 0,5292
2,13 0,0568 0,8448 0,7514 0,8468 1,1832 0,6637 0,5236
2,19 0,0081 0,8627 0,7257 0,8638 1,2797 0,9529 0,5196
         n.s.: no-solution
Table A.10.
S0 SD YD SD+YD (SD+YD)r S S p / p Incongruity E(YN)
73 0, S = α
0 0,0905 0,7958 0,7386 0,7951 1,1085 0,4314 0,5643
5 0,0597 0,8065 0,7218 0,8065 1,1647 0,6299 0,5500
8 0,0404 0,8129 0,7111 0,8135 1,2012 0,7515 0,5402
13 0,0068 0,8236 0,6920 0,8246 1,2673 0,9587 0,5250
16 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
19 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
75 0, S = α
0 0,1122 0,7957 0,7566 0,7952 1,0729 0,2950 0,5712
5 0,0812 0,8064 0,7397 0,8066 1,1276 0,4965 0,5569
8 0,0618 0,8128 0,7288 0,8137 1,1631 0,6198 0,5470
13 0,0281 0,8235 0,7097 0,8248 1,2274 0,8294 0,5318
16 0,0069 0,8299 0,6973 0,8317 1,2695 0,9584 0,5214
19 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
77 0, S = α
0 0,1336 0,7956 0,7743 0,7953 1,0391 0,1604 0,5781
5 0,1025 0,8063 0,7573 0,8067 1,0922 0,3644 0,5637
8 0,0830 0,8127 0,7464 0,8138 1,1267 0,4894 0,5538
13 0,0697 0,8170 0,7389 0,8188 1,1509 0,5734 0,5463
16 0,0278 0,8298 0,7147 0,8318 1,2302 0,8325 0,5281
19 0,0058 0,8363 0,7018 0,8387 1,2741 0,9653 0,5174
         n.s.: no-solution